Friday, 4 July 2014
CHILDREN'S SMILES FOUNDATION
In this month July 2014 we are starting to collect fund for the poor children, disabled, those who live in orphanages, etc. The targets are located in Jakarta, Indonesia.
Beside to help the poor boys and girls we also give campaign to educate them since the very earliest of age about the environment. To improve the awareness of the current young generation and future generation about global warming, renewable natural resources, etc.
Indonesia has very large forest area, wide ocean, huge numbers of archipelagos and fertile land surfaces need to be taken care and protect from any destruction.
We can safe the world from the closest place and from the smallest participation for the better future.
To participate in this programs you can remit the fund via below account:
IFO: Kurniawan
Acct No: 0009346371
Bank BNI 1946. Roa Malaka Branch
Jakarta, Indonesia
SWIFT Code: BNINIDJA
Thanks to help
Best Regards
Children's Smiles Foundation
Monday, 20 December 2010
Piracy and Ship Security
As companies and people look back over 2010 and take stock of the year, those involved in the piracy issue in the Indian Ocean realize that we are approaching a halfway point in what is turning out to be a pivotal year. This pivot point involves the arming of merchant vessels and how it is perceived. Up to this season (about September 2010), the concept of arming ships was considered to be, at the very least, controversial. As we begin to close out December, however, we see that this approach has gained significant popularity on one hand and, on the other hand, the detractors of it have grown increasingly silent.
On the pirate side of the equation, we have not seen an evolution-- we have seen a shift. The tactics being used by the pirates are essentially the same tactics that have been used for a while now. The weapons that the pirates have been using recently are the same weapons that have been used against the shipping industry for a while now. This is based on a check of the attacks reported to the IMB, EUNAVFOR, ReCAAP, NATO Counter Piracy Operation Ocean Shield, and other reporting centers. The only thing that has changed is that the pirates have decided that they can use captured vessels as mother ships when they are trying to extend their range. In fact, one might even argue that the only significant change is that the pirates are putting more effort into spreading themselves across the whole area so that the military forces are spread thinner. Again, this does not constitute an evolution in tactics or strategy...it is simply an adjustment of their already existing approaches.
On the other side of the equation, we have seen significant change in the industry. Not all these changes have been positive in nature.
The first major change involves the arming of vessels. At this time last year, the debate was in full swing as to whether or not ships should be armed. Amongst the most common arguments were that (1) it would escalate the situation if ships were armed, (2) sailors are not trained for this kind of thing and (3) it’s the navy’s job to handle protecting shipping. Most of those arguments have been resolved to a situation where private security companies are being asked to be able to provide armed security on board the vessel.
What was notable about this was that it appears, at least on the surface, to be a reversal of who is driving the show. Normally, the IMO provides guidance with flag state administrations coming closely behind. Then the shipping companies and others work in a compliance-focused mindset to ensure that they do not come into conflict with any major requirements. This time, the IMO was reasonably silent, shuffling the issue to the various flag states. While some flag states provided very clear and concise guidance, others have been remarkably silent on the issue. The end result, requests for security have evolved from just having security personnel on board to having armed security personnel on board—to meet corporate or insurer requirements.
At the same time, a crucial vulnerability has been appearing in the way that many organizations are thinking about security. Many require adherence to the Best Management Practices (BMP) as a minimum condition of contract...requiring ships to put in place the measures as part of the overall protective posture. There have been more than a few instances where these measures were not put in place, and the reasons given were the source of the concern.
The problem lies in the fact that there has been a trend to report a single measure as being why a ship defeated a pirate attack. In some cases, it was the speed of the vessel combined with its evasive actions. It has also included the presence of the safe room (misnamed as the citadel approach) and other measures. In and of themselves, these statements may well be supportable. They do not, however, answer why the ship could be reasonably secure. Nor do they address how a ship can be declared secure in the future.
What has failed is a basic understanding of one of the core principles of security—that it functions as a system. Consider this, there is no guarantee that an attack will only follow a certain course of action, there is only a reasonable expectation that it will. Similarly, there is no guarantee that one pirate will behave the same as the next pirate. This is one of the main reasons why different measures have been seen as the core or critical reason why certain ships were not taken.
This is one of the basic reasons why risk assessments are performed. They are intended to identify the scope of threats and vulnerabilities and then prioritize those, taking into account the impacts against our assets and operations. In most cases, the risk assessment will identify a number of different risks. It may even identify a number of different threats beyond those of the apparent topic at hand or the obvious. When security professionals assist in the design of security controls, they are doing so with an eye to using the most effective and efficient set of measures that address all risks that management finds intolerable.
By reducing the overall security system to a single security measure, the Company is essentially rolling the dice. Let`s move away from the fact that there may be multiple threats (and hence risks) and move back to the single issue of piracy. The gamble that it is making is that the measure that it selects will be the measure that a particular attacking pirate will be defeated by. One might argue that there is a history of success, but trusting past history to cover all potential future outcomes can be dicey at best. This is one of the main reasons why security professionals tend to rely upon a range of measures organized in an approach referred to as a layer of defence approach—where one fails, a backup or following measure takes over to stop the attacker.
This problem is compounded when you look at the use of firearms on board the vessel. Not only do you need to have the various layers of defence present in order to meet sound security practices. You also need them in place in order to prevent circumstances that could lead to significant legal issues.
The main issue in this case involves the escalation of force when applying the use of force continuum. Even as some ships have relied solely upon the safe rooms or the evasive actions of the ship, some companies have relied simply on the presence of armed (lethally) security on board the vessel with few (if any) other measures in place.
This leaves the ship vulnerable on two fronts. First, if the pirate can somehow overwhelm or bypass the security force, then there is little else to stop the attack from being successful. At the same time, the ship is vulnerable on another front. Instead of being able to escalate force, it can only give warnings that lethal force will be applied. This means that the warnings must be credible and, if not heeded, acted upon. In brief, a bolder (or even driven) attacker would only really be stopped when lethal force was applied...something that the ship is supposed to be avoided.
So the vital point will revolve around three factors. We are at a point where the pirates will have to evolve in their tactics or face failure at a regional level as we gradually strip away their capacity. We are vulnerable, however, to some unsound practices that leave single points or minimal points of failure in the overall system. Finally, by relying on a system that escalates quickly to the use of lethal force, we run the risks of unnecessary legal and ethical risks. To respond to this, we need to ensure that the various protective works are aligned correctly so that attacks are too complex to succeed, applied in a cost effective manner so as to provide some return on the investment and then applied appropriately so that we do not simply exchange one risk for another...only when that happens can we argue that there is a reasonable degree of security for the vessel and company.
www.evolutionarysecurity.com
www.issg-seamarshals.com
On the pirate side of the equation, we have not seen an evolution-- we have seen a shift. The tactics being used by the pirates are essentially the same tactics that have been used for a while now. The weapons that the pirates have been using recently are the same weapons that have been used against the shipping industry for a while now. This is based on a check of the attacks reported to the IMB, EUNAVFOR, ReCAAP, NATO Counter Piracy Operation Ocean Shield, and other reporting centers. The only thing that has changed is that the pirates have decided that they can use captured vessels as mother ships when they are trying to extend their range. In fact, one might even argue that the only significant change is that the pirates are putting more effort into spreading themselves across the whole area so that the military forces are spread thinner. Again, this does not constitute an evolution in tactics or strategy...it is simply an adjustment of their already existing approaches.
On the other side of the equation, we have seen significant change in the industry. Not all these changes have been positive in nature.
The first major change involves the arming of vessels. At this time last year, the debate was in full swing as to whether or not ships should be armed. Amongst the most common arguments were that (1) it would escalate the situation if ships were armed, (2) sailors are not trained for this kind of thing and (3) it’s the navy’s job to handle protecting shipping. Most of those arguments have been resolved to a situation where private security companies are being asked to be able to provide armed security on board the vessel.
What was notable about this was that it appears, at least on the surface, to be a reversal of who is driving the show. Normally, the IMO provides guidance with flag state administrations coming closely behind. Then the shipping companies and others work in a compliance-focused mindset to ensure that they do not come into conflict with any major requirements. This time, the IMO was reasonably silent, shuffling the issue to the various flag states. While some flag states provided very clear and concise guidance, others have been remarkably silent on the issue. The end result, requests for security have evolved from just having security personnel on board to having armed security personnel on board—to meet corporate or insurer requirements.
At the same time, a crucial vulnerability has been appearing in the way that many organizations are thinking about security. Many require adherence to the Best Management Practices (BMP) as a minimum condition of contract...requiring ships to put in place the measures as part of the overall protective posture. There have been more than a few instances where these measures were not put in place, and the reasons given were the source of the concern.
The problem lies in the fact that there has been a trend to report a single measure as being why a ship defeated a pirate attack. In some cases, it was the speed of the vessel combined with its evasive actions. It has also included the presence of the safe room (misnamed as the citadel approach) and other measures. In and of themselves, these statements may well be supportable. They do not, however, answer why the ship could be reasonably secure. Nor do they address how a ship can be declared secure in the future.
What has failed is a basic understanding of one of the core principles of security—that it functions as a system. Consider this, there is no guarantee that an attack will only follow a certain course of action, there is only a reasonable expectation that it will. Similarly, there is no guarantee that one pirate will behave the same as the next pirate. This is one of the main reasons why different measures have been seen as the core or critical reason why certain ships were not taken.
This is one of the basic reasons why risk assessments are performed. They are intended to identify the scope of threats and vulnerabilities and then prioritize those, taking into account the impacts against our assets and operations. In most cases, the risk assessment will identify a number of different risks. It may even identify a number of different threats beyond those of the apparent topic at hand or the obvious. When security professionals assist in the design of security controls, they are doing so with an eye to using the most effective and efficient set of measures that address all risks that management finds intolerable.
By reducing the overall security system to a single security measure, the Company is essentially rolling the dice. Let`s move away from the fact that there may be multiple threats (and hence risks) and move back to the single issue of piracy. The gamble that it is making is that the measure that it selects will be the measure that a particular attacking pirate will be defeated by. One might argue that there is a history of success, but trusting past history to cover all potential future outcomes can be dicey at best. This is one of the main reasons why security professionals tend to rely upon a range of measures organized in an approach referred to as a layer of defence approach—where one fails, a backup or following measure takes over to stop the attacker.
This problem is compounded when you look at the use of firearms on board the vessel. Not only do you need to have the various layers of defence present in order to meet sound security practices. You also need them in place in order to prevent circumstances that could lead to significant legal issues.
The main issue in this case involves the escalation of force when applying the use of force continuum. Even as some ships have relied solely upon the safe rooms or the evasive actions of the ship, some companies have relied simply on the presence of armed (lethally) security on board the vessel with few (if any) other measures in place.
This leaves the ship vulnerable on two fronts. First, if the pirate can somehow overwhelm or bypass the security force, then there is little else to stop the attack from being successful. At the same time, the ship is vulnerable on another front. Instead of being able to escalate force, it can only give warnings that lethal force will be applied. This means that the warnings must be credible and, if not heeded, acted upon. In brief, a bolder (or even driven) attacker would only really be stopped when lethal force was applied...something that the ship is supposed to be avoided.
So the vital point will revolve around three factors. We are at a point where the pirates will have to evolve in their tactics or face failure at a regional level as we gradually strip away their capacity. We are vulnerable, however, to some unsound practices that leave single points or minimal points of failure in the overall system. Finally, by relying on a system that escalates quickly to the use of lethal force, we run the risks of unnecessary legal and ethical risks. To respond to this, we need to ensure that the various protective works are aligned correctly so that attacks are too complex to succeed, applied in a cost effective manner so as to provide some return on the investment and then applied appropriately so that we do not simply exchange one risk for another...only when that happens can we argue that there is a reasonable degree of security for the vessel and company.
www.evolutionarysecurity.com
www.issg-seamarshals.com
Malaysian vessel hijacked by pirates two days before dinghies arrive in Maldives
By JJ Robinson
Malaysian vessel hijacked by pirates two days before dinghies arrive in Maldives thumbnail Somali pirates have hijacked a Malaysian vessel west of the Maldives on Friday, according to reports from the EU’s anti-piracy force, days before a pair of dinghies containing 10 Somali nationals were discovered stranded near islands in the country’s south.
The EU’s Operation Atalanta taskforce reported that the ‘Albedo’ was hijacked 900 nautical miles east of the Somali capital of Mogadishu in the early hours of November 26. The vessel was carrying containers and was bound for Mombasa from Jebel Ali in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), according to the Vesseltracker website.
The crew consist of 23 people from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Iran. The EU taskforce’s report did not say whether the ‘Albedo’ crew were being held hostage, however it noted that Somali pirates are currently holding 22 vessels with 521 hostages.
Two days (November 28) after the taking of the Albedo, a dinghy containing seven Somali nationals was brought ashore after it was discovered in Gnaviyani Atoll. The Maldives National Defence Force (MNDF) discovered a bullet shell during a search of the vessel.
On November 30, a second dinghy containing three Somali nationals was discovered by a Maldivian fishing near Thinadhoo in Gaafu Dhaalu Atoll.
The captain of the fishing boat Mohamed Hussain told Minivan News that one of the men had a stab wound in his neck and was seriously injured.
During an MNDF press conference yesterday, Brigadier General Zakariyya Mansoor said that Somali nationals found in Maldivian waters recently were potentially not castaways, as they may have appeared.
“They pretend to be out fishing when they lose contact with their main vessel,” he explained.
”They are actually coming from a [mothership] used for hijacking yachts and cargo ships,” said Mansoor. ”When they lose contact with the main ship they shutdown their engine to save diesel until they find land.”
Mansoor noted that many of the ‘castaways’ found in the Maldivian waters had both diesel and food, and that their physical condition was not weak.
”Although piracy decreases during this season because of rough seas, when the sea is calm, more than 400 to 500 such boats will be active in these waters,” said Mansoor.
He advised fisherman not to get too close to anonymous boats without first informing the island offices and the MNDF.
”Without doubt they are very dangerous,” he said.
Foreign Minister Dr Ahmed Shaheed said the government was working with their Somali counterparts to repatriate Somali nationals stranded in the Maldives, but added that this was difficult because of the “logistics and funds required.”
“At the moment [the arrivals] are alarming but not a direct threat,” Dr Shaheed said. “They are at the outer limits of their reach at the moment, but their reach is increasing.”
According to the ICC Commercial Crime Service, suspected Somali pirate vessels have been reported attacking vessels off the Seychelles and west of the Maldives.
“Pirates use ocean going vessels ‘mother vessels’ to sail far from Somali coast to attack and hijack passing vessels. Smaller skiffs are launched from the pirate “mother vessel” to attack passing merchant vessels, the ICC reported. “Pirates are heavily armed with automatic weapons and RPG launchers.”
Malaysian vessel hijacked by pirates two days before dinghies arrive in Maldives thumbnail Somali pirates have hijacked a Malaysian vessel west of the Maldives on Friday, according to reports from the EU’s anti-piracy force, days before a pair of dinghies containing 10 Somali nationals were discovered stranded near islands in the country’s south.
The EU’s Operation Atalanta taskforce reported that the ‘Albedo’ was hijacked 900 nautical miles east of the Somali capital of Mogadishu in the early hours of November 26. The vessel was carrying containers and was bound for Mombasa from Jebel Ali in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), according to the Vesseltracker website.
The crew consist of 23 people from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Iran. The EU taskforce’s report did not say whether the ‘Albedo’ crew were being held hostage, however it noted that Somali pirates are currently holding 22 vessels with 521 hostages.
Two days (November 28) after the taking of the Albedo, a dinghy containing seven Somali nationals was brought ashore after it was discovered in Gnaviyani Atoll. The Maldives National Defence Force (MNDF) discovered a bullet shell during a search of the vessel.
On November 30, a second dinghy containing three Somali nationals was discovered by a Maldivian fishing near Thinadhoo in Gaafu Dhaalu Atoll.
The captain of the fishing boat Mohamed Hussain told Minivan News that one of the men had a stab wound in his neck and was seriously injured.
During an MNDF press conference yesterday, Brigadier General Zakariyya Mansoor said that Somali nationals found in Maldivian waters recently were potentially not castaways, as they may have appeared.
“They pretend to be out fishing when they lose contact with their main vessel,” he explained.
”They are actually coming from a [mothership] used for hijacking yachts and cargo ships,” said Mansoor. ”When they lose contact with the main ship they shutdown their engine to save diesel until they find land.”
Mansoor noted that many of the ‘castaways’ found in the Maldivian waters had both diesel and food, and that their physical condition was not weak.
”Although piracy decreases during this season because of rough seas, when the sea is calm, more than 400 to 500 such boats will be active in these waters,” said Mansoor.
He advised fisherman not to get too close to anonymous boats without first informing the island offices and the MNDF.
”Without doubt they are very dangerous,” he said.
Foreign Minister Dr Ahmed Shaheed said the government was working with their Somali counterparts to repatriate Somali nationals stranded in the Maldives, but added that this was difficult because of the “logistics and funds required.”
“At the moment [the arrivals] are alarming but not a direct threat,” Dr Shaheed said. “They are at the outer limits of their reach at the moment, but their reach is increasing.”
According to the ICC Commercial Crime Service, suspected Somali pirate vessels have been reported attacking vessels off the Seychelles and west of the Maldives.
“Pirates use ocean going vessels ‘mother vessels’ to sail far from Somali coast to attack and hijack passing vessels. Smaller skiffs are launched from the pirate “mother vessel” to attack passing merchant vessels, the ICC reported. “Pirates are heavily armed with automatic weapons and RPG launchers.”
Thursday, 9 July 2009
MALAYSIAN SHIP OWNERS' ASSOCIATION
1 AGA-Intra Sdn Bhd
2 Ageo Marine Sdn Bhd
3 Ajang Shipping Sdn Bhd
4 Alam Gula Sdn Bhd
5 Alam Maritim (M) Sdn Bhd
6 AME Marine Services Sdn Bhd
7 Amsbach Marine (M) Sdn Bhd
8 Ancom Ship Management Sdn Bhd
9 Ban Hoe Leong Marine Supplies Sdn. Bhd
10 Bendera Mawar Sdn Bhd
11 Bintang Impresif Sdn Bhd
12 Brantas Sdn Bhd
13 Bumi Armada Navigation Sdn Bhd
14 Clamshell Dredging Sdn Bhd
15 DESB Marine Services Sdn Bhd
16 Dickson Marine Co Sdn Bhd
17 Dinastia Jati Sdn Bhd
18 EA Marine Services Sdn Bhd
19 E.A. Technique (M) Sdn Bhd
20 Ecoship Sdn Bhd
21 Epic Industri (M) Sdn Bhd
22 Fast Meridian Sdn Bhd
23 Gagasan Carriers Sdn Bhd
24 Gallant Features Sdn Bhd
25 Gaya Shipping Sdn Bhd
26 Geniki Sdn Bhd
27 Global Carriers Berhad
28 GS Tankers Sdn Bhd
29 Halim Mazmin Bhd
30 Harbour-Link Group Bhd
2 Ageo Marine Sdn Bhd
3 Ajang Shipping Sdn Bhd
4 Alam Gula Sdn Bhd
5 Alam Maritim (M) Sdn Bhd
6 AME Marine Services Sdn Bhd
7 Amsbach Marine (M) Sdn Bhd
8 Ancom Ship Management Sdn Bhd
9 Ban Hoe Leong Marine Supplies Sdn. Bhd
10 Bendera Mawar Sdn Bhd
11 Bintang Impresif Sdn Bhd
12 Brantas Sdn Bhd
13 Bumi Armada Navigation Sdn Bhd
14 Clamshell Dredging Sdn Bhd
15 DESB Marine Services Sdn Bhd
16 Dickson Marine Co Sdn Bhd
17 Dinastia Jati Sdn Bhd
18 EA Marine Services Sdn Bhd
19 E.A. Technique (M) Sdn Bhd
20 Ecoship Sdn Bhd
21 Epic Industri (M) Sdn Bhd
22 Fast Meridian Sdn Bhd
23 Gagasan Carriers Sdn Bhd
24 Gallant Features Sdn Bhd
25 Gaya Shipping Sdn Bhd
26 Geniki Sdn Bhd
27 Global Carriers Berhad
28 GS Tankers Sdn Bhd
29 Halim Mazmin Bhd
30 Harbour-Link Group Bhd
31 Ilham Marine Services Sdn Bhd
32 Inai Kiara Sdn Bhd
33 Innatech Sdn Bhd
34 Intra Oil Services Bhd
35 Jasa Merin (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd
36 Johan Shipping Sdn Bhd
37 JRI Resources Sdn Bhd
38 Jumewah Shipping Sdn Bhd
39 K.K Regional Navigation Sdn Bhd
40 KIC Oil & Gas Sdn Bhd
41 KSP Towage Sdn Bhd
42 LKC Shipping Line Sdn Bhd
43 Lunar Shipping Sdn Bhd
44 M3nergy Berhad
45 Malaysia Shipping Corp Sdn Bhd
46 Malaysian Towage And Transport Sdn Bhd
47 Malaysian Maritime & Dredging Corp S/B
48 Malaysian Merchant Marine Bhd
49 Malsuria Holdings (M) Sdn Bhd
50 Master Offshore Sdn Bhd
51 Mayang Navigation Sdn Bhd
52 MISC Bhd
53 Nepline Bhd
54 Offshoreworks Sdn Bhd
55 Onsys Energy Sdn Bhd
56 Oriental Grandeur Sdn Bhd
57 Orion Service Sdn Bhd
58 Pengangkutan Kekal Sdn Bhd
59 Perkapalan Dai Zhun Sdn Bhd
60 Powertium Marine Sdn Bhd
32 Inai Kiara Sdn Bhd
33 Innatech Sdn Bhd
34 Intra Oil Services Bhd
35 Jasa Merin (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd
36 Johan Shipping Sdn Bhd
37 JRI Resources Sdn Bhd
38 Jumewah Shipping Sdn Bhd
39 K.K Regional Navigation Sdn Bhd
40 KIC Oil & Gas Sdn Bhd
41 KSP Towage Sdn Bhd
42 LKC Shipping Line Sdn Bhd
43 Lunar Shipping Sdn Bhd
44 M3nergy Berhad
45 Malaysia Shipping Corp Sdn Bhd
46 Malaysian Towage And Transport Sdn Bhd
47 Malaysian Maritime & Dredging Corp S/B
48 Malaysian Merchant Marine Bhd
49 Malsuria Holdings (M) Sdn Bhd
50 Master Offshore Sdn Bhd
51 Mayang Navigation Sdn Bhd
52 MISC Bhd
53 Nepline Bhd
54 Offshoreworks Sdn Bhd
55 Onsys Energy Sdn Bhd
56 Oriental Grandeur Sdn Bhd
57 Orion Service Sdn Bhd
58 Pengangkutan Kekal Sdn Bhd
59 Perkapalan Dai Zhun Sdn Bhd
60 Powertium Marine Sdn Bhd
Monday, 6 July 2009
61 SAAG Shipping (M) Sdn Bhd
62 Samprise Marin Sdn Bhd
63 Sang Muara Sdn Bhd
64 Sarku Engineering Services Sdn Bhd
65 Scomi Oilserve Sdn Bhd
66 Sealink Sdn Bhd
67 See Song & Sons Sdn Bhd
68 See Yong & Son Construction Sdn Bhd
69 Semaring Logistics (M) Sdn Bhd
70 Semua Shipping Sdn Bhd
71 Shin Yang Shipping Sdn Bhd
72 Shipet Maritime Sdn Bhd
73 Sigur Ros Sdn Bhd
74 Sribima (M) Shipping Sdn Bhd
75 Straits Auto Logistics Sdn Bhd
76 Straits Perkasa Services Sdn Bhd
77 Success Blossom Sdn Bhd
78 Syarikat Borcos Shipping Sdn Bhd
79 Syarikat Pengangkutan Bonggaya Sdn Bhd
80 T.A.G. Marine Sdn Bhd
81 Tanjung Kapal Services Sdn Bhd
82 Tanjung Offshore Services Sdn Bhd
83 Thailine Sdn Bhd
84 THS Construction Enterprise
85 TL Geosciences Sdn Bhd
86 Transpet Sdn Bhd
87 Tuah Tankers Sdn Bhd
88 Vastalux Sdn Bhd
89 Victory Supply Sdn Bhd
90 Viva Omega Sdn Bhd
91 Wawasan Shipping Sdn Bhd
92 Wira Swire Sdn Bhd
93 Yayasan Sabah Shipping Sdn Bhd
62 Samprise Marin Sdn Bhd
63 Sang Muara Sdn Bhd
64 Sarku Engineering Services Sdn Bhd
65 Scomi Oilserve Sdn Bhd
66 Sealink Sdn Bhd
67 See Song & Sons Sdn Bhd
68 See Yong & Son Construction Sdn Bhd
69 Semaring Logistics (M) Sdn Bhd
70 Semua Shipping Sdn Bhd
71 Shin Yang Shipping Sdn Bhd
72 Shipet Maritime Sdn Bhd
73 Sigur Ros Sdn Bhd
74 Sribima (M) Shipping Sdn Bhd
75 Straits Auto Logistics Sdn Bhd
76 Straits Perkasa Services Sdn Bhd
77 Success Blossom Sdn Bhd
78 Syarikat Borcos Shipping Sdn Bhd
79 Syarikat Pengangkutan Bonggaya Sdn Bhd
80 T.A.G. Marine Sdn Bhd
81 Tanjung Kapal Services Sdn Bhd
82 Tanjung Offshore Services Sdn Bhd
83 Thailine Sdn Bhd
84 THS Construction Enterprise
85 TL Geosciences Sdn Bhd
86 Transpet Sdn Bhd
87 Tuah Tankers Sdn Bhd
88 Vastalux Sdn Bhd
89 Victory Supply Sdn Bhd
90 Viva Omega Sdn Bhd
91 Wawasan Shipping Sdn Bhd
92 Wira Swire Sdn Bhd
93 Yayasan Sabah Shipping Sdn Bhd
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